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Abstract  
Current policy proposals about moving away from HIV/AIDS-specific funding towards responding to HIV/AIDS 
within a broader health system are taking place alongside policy proposals about abolishing OOPE as a source for 
financing health care. This implies however, a policy dilemma in the context of Africa for two reasons.  First, the 
possibility that the response to HIV/AIDS within a broader health system is likely to a decrease in investments specific 
to HIV/AIDS interventions, which in turn is likely to cause an increase in OOPE on health care. Second, increasing the 
use of OOPE on health care is fundamentally in opposition to the international policy agenda of moving towards 
universal health coverage. To avoid the dilemma in policymaking, estimates of the relationships between foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE, particularly in Africa, are needed to advise policy makers. To this 
end, this paper uses static and dynamic fixed-effect regression models on data collected over the period 2000-2012 to 
determine whether foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa have increased or decreased OOPE on 
health care. The results indicate that these investments have decreased OOPE on health care. Therefore, to be 
consistent with other international policy goals such as moving towards universal health care coverage, policies that 
target the response to HIV/AIDS and that contribute to the reduction of the need to use OOPE should be maintained.  
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Introduction© 
Following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 
2007-8 the dramatic increase in overseas spending 
on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, which had 
been evidenced over the previous 10 years, began to 
reverse. The GFC induced a squeeze on foreign 
governments and donors who began to question and 
reduce their financial commitments to all foreign aid 
including HIV/AIDS spending. This reduction in 
assistance also induced a mindset change and 
foreign governments and donors began to emphasize 
the ‘mainstreaming’ of HIV/AIDS by responding to 
testing and treatment needs within the broader 
health system (UNAIDS, 2013, p. 102). Alongside 
these policy changes, international health policy 
makers were championing universal health care 
coverage within public health systems. 
This shift in emphasis to the method of funding 
HIV/AIDS changed its special treatment within health 
systems. A reduction in stand-alone HIV/AIDS 
program funding and its mainstreaming would be 
likely to increase the burden of disease on people 
living with HIV (PLHIV) given the already 
overwhelmed public health systems of almost all 
African countries. This mainstreaming change would 
also be likely to increase the likelihood that out of 
pocket payments (OOPE) by PLHIV would now be 
required for their treatment as OOPE is a common 
feature of many African public health care systems. 
Unless it is shown that the decrease in the funding 
of HIV/AIDS interventions does not increase OOPE 
on health care, there is likely to be an international 
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policy dilemma as a decrease in funding might 
contradict the need to reduce OOPE on health care. 
So, this paper aims to determine whether or not 
changes to the funding of HIV/AIDS interventions 
has resulted in a decrease of OOPE on general 
health care in Africa.  
1. Background  
HIV/AIDS has been one of the most significant 
causes of the burden of disease in Africa. In 2012, 
while the continent accounted for only 15% of the 
world population (United Nations, 2013), it suffered 
about 70% of world HIV/AIDS-related deaths 
(UNAIDS, 2013, p. A43). In absolute numbers, of 
the 1.7 million HIV/AIDS-related deaths in the 
world in 2012, about 1.2 million people who died in 
the epidemic were from Africa. Because there is 
very limited financial protection in African 
countries (Kankeu et al., 2013, p. 2), households 
mostly use OOPE to fund heath care (Onoka et al., 
2011). This use has in turn been achieved through 
strategies such as selling assets, depleting savings, 
and borrowing, which has been impoverishing 
(Saksena et al., 2011, p. 1).  
The good news is, however, that investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions have been effective in 
decreasing morbidity and mortality. In Africa, 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions increased 
from US$2.92 billion in 1996 to US$15.6 billion in 
2008 (UNAIDS, 2010). Despite the recent financial 
crisis, these investments continued to increase, 
albeit modestly, such that US$18.9 billion were 
spent on HIV/AIDS interventions in 2012. This was 
a 10% increase over the amount invested in 2011 
(UNAIDS, 2013). Furthermore, the share of 
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investments in HIV/AIDS interventions in total 
health spending shows the importance of these 
investments. In 2007, for example, investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions alone accounted for about 
20% of total health spending (Amico, 2010). These 
investments in HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment 
have resulted in significant behavior change and 
reduction in viral infections, which in turn had a 
tremendous effect on morbidity and mortality 
(UNAIDS, 2013, p. 2). Undoubtedly, these 
investments have had an effect on OOPE, which is 
very high in Africa (Sambo et al., 2013).  
Notwithstanding the last observation, the motivation 
for this study lies in the fact that the effect of 
foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions on 
OOPE in the whole of Africa is not obvious. The 
reason for this is that Africa is diverse in terms of 
the burden of HIV/AIDS with HIV prevalence 
ranging from 0.1% in North Africa to 25% in 
Southern Africa. In countries where HIV/AIDS 
constitutes a significant burden of disease, 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions are 
expected to decrease OOPE on health care, while in 
countries where other diseases are more significant 
than HIV/AIDS, the effect of these investments is 
unknown. In the latter countries, for example, an 
increase in foreign investments in HIV/AIDS 
interventions could release financial pressure through 
the substitution effect between foreign investments and 
OOPE on health care or through a reduction of the 
burden of HIV/AIDS. The released income could, 
however, be spent on general household 
consumption or on other non-HIV/AIDS diseases. 
Thus, the effect of these investments on OOPE on 
health care in Africa is an empirical question.  
The study is also motivated by the importance of 
this analysis for policymaking. In fact, international 
policy makers have been trying to achieve universal 
health coverage in developing countries. This 
consists of providing everyone with essential health 
services without the risk of impoverishment. 
Avoiding such risks involves reducing almost to 
zero the amount of OOPE at the point of health care 
service (World Health Organisation, 2013). 
Therefore, it follows that any policy on foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions that is likely 
to keep OOPE a principal source of health care 
usage, would contradict the move towards universal 
coverage. A policy such as responding to HIV/AIDS 
through broader health system-strengthening 
strategies is likely to increase OOPE because it 
would decrease direct investments in HIV/AIDS 
interventions. Therefore, a sound policy that affects 
foreign investments should be informed by 
estimates of the relationship between these 
investments and OOPE on health care.  
To our knowledge, there has not been such evidence 
to inform policy makers. The available evidence in 
Africa has mainly been produced using household 
survey data. A more recent study using survey data 
in Tanzania (Brinda et al., 2014) found that 
economic inequality, gender disparity and 
prevalence of disability were the key factors 
determining OOPE. Onwujekwe et al. (2010) found 
similar results using household survey data in 
Nigeria. Noteworthy is that the evidence of the 
burden of illness as the most important determinant 
of OOPE from household surveys is not unique to 
Africa. In China, for example, You and Kobayashi 
(2011) found that illness and self-reported health 
were the key factors influencing OOPE. At a 
macro-level analysis, related studies analyzed 
determinants of health expenditure including 
OOPE as one type of these expenditures. The most 
recent of these studies is Xu et al. (2011). This 
study analyzed these determinants in 143 
developing countries and found that demographics 
and health system characteristics were the most 
important factors influencing OOPE. The reviewed 
studies suggest that evidence either was at the 
household level or was irrelevant to Africa or did 
not focus specifically on the effect of foreign 
investments on OOPE. The gaps identified in the 
literature above warrant further research into the role 
of foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions on 
OOPE on health care in Africa and the legitimate 
contribution of this study to the literature.  
The remainder of the discussion is organized as 
follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical and 
conceptual framework, section 3 discusses the 
methodology used, section 4 presents the results, 
section 5 discusses the results, while the final 
section concludes the study.  
2. Theoretical and conceptual framework 
The relationship between foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE on health care 
can be analyzed within the framework of the 
determinants of expenditure, which can be traced 
back to a theory of Keynes (1936). In his book 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Keynes explained that income was a key 
determinant of expenditure. He explained that as 
people get increments of income, they decide for 
each increment a proportion to be spent, which he 
termed the marginal propensity to consume. An 
important aspect of the theory is the explanation of 
factors likely to influence that proportion. The 
theory explained that factors as such wealth, goods or 
services-own prices, prices of substitutes and 
complements were important in explaining 
expenditures. Pigou (1943) more explicitly explained 
wealth as factors influencing expenditure. Other 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 12, Issue 1, 2015 
78 
determinants of expenditure modelled as autonomous 
in the Keynesian theory such as preferences, culture, 
location, and lifestyle, demographic characteristics 
were, at least implicitly, considered by Engel’s (1895) 
and Becker’s (1976) theories. In fact, Engel’s theory 
on household’s consumption referred to demographic 
characteristics such as the size of the household as an 
important variable influencing food consumption 
while  Becker’s (1976) theory expanded on earlier 
theoretical formulations focusing on environmental 
and other factors influencing the choice between time 
of work and leisure. The influence of these factors on 
expenditure lies in how the choice between time of 
work and leisure are related to income.  
Both these incomes and non-income factors’ 
theoretical formulations can be transposed to 
explain the link between foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE. Foreign 
investments can be seen as an additional income, 
which households can use according to their 
preferences. Depending on their attitude towards 
these investments, there can be a negative effect on 
OOPE on health care or no effect. A negative effect 
on OOPE on health care can happen when 
households use a portion of foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions as a substitute for OOPE, 
diverting this OOPE towards non-health 
consumption. Another effect, happens when this 
OOPE is diverted towards health consumption for 
non-HIV diseases. Others non-economic factors 
exposed by the theories above such as location, 
preferences, environments can be extended to 
demographic and epidemiological characteristics 
such as life expectancy, the burden of diseases, 
health system organization used in this paper to 
control for the effect of foreign investments on 
OOPE on health care.  
3. Methodology  
3.1. Model specification. An analysis of whether 
foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions 
increase or decrease OOPE on health care requires a 
methodology that makes it possible to isolate the 
individual effect of these investments. To this end, 
the paper used panel data regression because of its 
advantages in making inferences that are more 
accurate and its greater capacity for capturing the 
complexity of human behavior than a single cross-
section and time series (Hsiao, 2006, p. 3). For a 
detailed discussion of these advantages, see Baltagi 
(2008). Panel data regressions entail two broad 
specifications, the fixed-effect specification and the 
random-effect specification. The fixed-effect 
specification assumes that the members of the panel 
have time-invariant characteristics that might 
interfere with the relationship of interest, here, the 
relationship between foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE on health care. 
The random effect in contrast, assumes that over 
time, there are no systematic differences in members 
of the panel that might affect that relationship.  
This study adopted a fixed-effect specification due 
to African countries having different features that 
have not changed over time. For example, some 
countries have been politically unstable whilst 
others have had relative political stability over the 
years. Political stability has been found to be a 
factor in productivity, economic growth and hence 
income which is a major determinant of expenditure 
including OOPE on health care. The preference of 
the fixed-effect model was backed by previous 
successful use of the model (Xu et al., 2011) as well 
as the formal Haussmann specification test 
(Haussmann, 1978). 
Taking account on the nature of the relationship 
between the variables of interest in the specification, 
we first assumed that foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions were independent of 
national income. This assumption resulted in the 
static fixed-effect model as follows.  
,it it i ity ' x u e= + +β                                       (1) 
where xit is a vector of explanatory variables including foreign HIV/AIDS expenditure, ui is a 
variable reflecting time-invariant characteristics of 
each of the countries, while eit is assumed to be the 
country effect that is varying with time. Estimation 
was done using the least square dummy variable 
method.  
Second, a plausible assumption was made that 
foreign country investments in HIV/AIDS 
interventions is determined in accordance with the 
host country’s level of national income in the 
previous year. Given that current foreign 
investments can have some influence on current 
OOPE on health care and given the assumption that 
current foreign investments can be influenced by 
previous income (by previous OOPE on health care 
by inference), it can be deduced that previous OOPE 
on health care influence current OOPE on health 
care. Therefore, the possible effect of previous 
OOPE on health care on current OOPE on health 
care resulted in the use of a dynamic fixed-effect 
specification, that is, including a lagged variable of 
the dependent variable as in (2) below. 
1 ,it it it i ity y ' x u e−= + + +β         (2) 
while the least square dummy variable (LSDV) 
technique may produce unbiased estimates for the 
first specification in equation (1), it does not do so 
for the second specification in equation (2). The 
adding of a lagged dependent variable in the second 
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specification makes it correlated with the error term 
eit because of its correlation with the dependent 
variable. The inclusion causes the time-invariant ui to be correlated with the error term because it is 
correlated with the lagged dependent variable. This 
correlation leads to biased results particularly in 
panels where the time observations are smaller than 
panel members observation (Nickell, 1981), such as 
in this study. A re-specification, which eliminates 
the time-invariant term through first differencing, is 
done in (3),  
1 ,it it it ity y ' x e−Δ = Δ + Δ + Δβ      (3) 
and an addition of an instrument (the second lag of 
the dependent variable yit-2) is done in (4)  
1 2 ,it it it it ity y y ' x e− −Δ = Δ + + Δ +Δβ                     (4) 
to correct for the bias, as proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) in their generalized 
methods of moments (GMM) method.  
3.2. Data collection. Data for these variables were 
available for 46 countries over the period 2000-
2012. All countries with incomplete records on 
variables of interest to the study were excluded. 
These countries were Cape Verde, Libya, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. 
Table 1 indicates the variables used, and the sources 
of the data. A summary of the data collected are in 
Table 2 below. 
Table 1. Variables and data sources 
Nature and name of the 
variable Meaning of the variable Title Source 
Dependent variable  
Out-of-pocket expenditure on 
general health care Percentage of out-of-pocket expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure  Oop World Development Indicators  
Independent variables  
Income per capita The average income per person per year measured in US$  Gdp World Development Indicators 
Foreign HIV/AIDS expenditure The amount of disbursement of HIV/AIDS to developing countries in US$ hive Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
Life expectancy  The average number of years a person in a given country is expected to live. The variable is used to measure the general burden of diseases  le World Health Statistics  
Insurance  The extent of the health insurance in term of prepayment for health care. Measured as the percentage of this contribution to private health care expenditure insur World Development Indicators 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Maximum Observations 
OOPE  
Overall 73.70 24.27 5 100 322 
Between  23.96 12.85 100 46 
Within  5.08 50.42 96.42 7 
Ln HIV expenditure  
Overall 43,900,000 90,000,000 257,152 803,000,000 322 
Between  53,900,000 167,694 3,000,000 46 
Within  72,400,000 231,000 541000,000 7 
GDP per capita 
Overall 1561.60 2627.26 110 23432.00 322 
Between  2029.35 168.85 9292.86 46 
Within  1691.35 7529.68 15701.86 7 
HIV prevalence rate % 
Overall 5.24 6.58 0.1 28.2 322 
Between  6.50 0.1 25.6 46 
Within  1.34 -13.80 8.89 7 
Life expectancy 
Overall 59.20 6.98 47.5 75.2 322 
Between  7.00 47.5 75.2 46 
Within  0.81 56.72 72.06 7 
Sources: World Bank (n.d), World Health Organization (n.d), Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (n.d).  
The study would have liked to analyze the effect of 
total public investments in HIV/AIDS interventions in 
Africa combining foreign investments in HIV/AIDS 
 
interventions with national governments’ investments. 
However because data from national governments 
were hard to come by, the study used foreign 
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investments in HIV/AIDS interventions as a variable 
of interest, to produce estimates relevant for current 
policy directions. 
3.3. Data analysis. Because of the differences 
across African countries on a variety of 
perspectives, the analysis by groupings of these 
countries by income levels, HIV/AIDS prevalence 
levels, health system characteristics was necessary 
in order to see the difference in the impacts of 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions on OOPE 
on health care across these groupings. Given that 
most of these groupings had insufficient 
observations, which would make them unsuitable 
for regression analysis, these relationships were 
analyzed using graphical analysis (Figures 1 to 4) 
and groupings’ dummy variables (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Dummy variables explanation 
Dummy variable Explanation 
Income  
gdpdum1 Countries with a GDP per capita <US$400 
gdpdum2 Countries with income per capita between US$400 and US$1000 
gdpdum3 Countries with a GDP per capita greater than US$1000 
HIV prevalence  
prevdum1 Countries with prevalence rate of <1% for people aged 15-59 
prevdum2 Countries with prevalence rate  between 1% and 5% for people aged 15-59 
prevdum3 Countries with prevalence rate between 5% and 10% for people aged 15-59 
prevdum4 Countries with prevalence rate above 10% for people aged 15-59 
Health system 
hsdum1 Countries with prepayment for health care representing less than 5% of THE  
hsdum2 Countries with prepayment for health care representing less than 5-10% of THE 
hsdum3 Countries with prepayment for health care representing above 10% of THE 
 
Finally, on the basis that the burden of diseases is an 
important determinant of OOPE on health care, but is 
associated in a complex manner with socioeconomic 
status, the impact of foreign HIV/AIDS expenditure on 
OOPE on health care was assessed by considering that 
it might be interacting with broader socioeconomic 
status. Using GDP per capita as the best proxy for 
socioeconomic status, the impact of investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions was measured by adding to 
the baseline regression the interaction term between 
the investments in HIV/AIDS interventions variable 
and GDP (intGDP). 
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive analysis. A preliminary 
exploration of the relationship between foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE 
in health care is presented in Figure 1. It shows a 
negative relationship between the two variables, 
indicating that an increase in investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions decreases OOPE on health 
care in Africa. The correlation coefficient r = -0.262, 
however, shows only a weak correlation between 
the two variables.  
 
Fig. 1. Relationship between investments in HIV/AIDS interventions and OOPE on health care 
The negative relationship between the two variables 
is also found in different groupings of countries 
stratified according to average income (GDP per 
capita). Figure 2 shows that there are correlation 
Correlation coefficient r=‐0.262 
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differences even though they may not be marked.  
In countries with income per capita less than 
US$400, the correlation between the two variables 
(-0.260) is not very different from the correlation 
for the whole of Africa.  
African countries however differ with respect to 
other factors likely to influence OOPE, such as 
income levels, HIV/AIDS prevalence, and health 
systems. Next, an analysis was undertaken to see 
whether the pattern of correlation differed across 
these groupings. Figure 2 shows that the correlation 
between OOPE on health care and investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions in the poorest countries 
(less than US$400) and the correlation between the 
two variables in the richest countries is not different  
(-0.260 and -0.207, respectively). The correlation 
seems to be high (-0.446), however, in countries with 
income per capita between US400 and US$1000.  
 
Fig. 2. Comparison of the relationship  between foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions on OOPE by income 
grouping 
Across HIV prevalance groupings, the correlation is also generally negative with a tendency to have no 
correlation in countries with low prevalence. The correlation seems to be higher in countries with medium 
income. 
  
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.260 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.446 
 
Correlation coefficient r=‐0.207 
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Fig. 3. Relationship between HIV/AIDS expenditure and OOPE in countries with different levels of prevalence 
Across health care system characteristics, it is found 
that in countries in which there is a high level of 
prepayment, there seems to be no problem. The 
analysis above shows that there is generally a negative 
relationship between HIV/AIDS expenditure on 
OOPE on health care. 
 
 
 
 
 
Correlation coefficient r = 0.025 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.04 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.292 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.151 
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Fig. 4. Relationship between HIV/AIDS expenditure and OOPE on health care in systems with different levels of 
prepayment for health care 
4.2. Econometric results. Table 4 reports the first 
set of results in which the effect of the main 
variables are considered. The table shows that the 
elasticity of OOPE (variable oop) on health care 
relative to a change in foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions (lnHIV) ranges from 0.012 
 
to 0.020 across the two models used. The result 
matches the a priori expectation that an increase in 
HIV/AIDS expenditure decreases OOPE on health 
care. This result suggests that HIV/AIDS constitutes 
one of the most important burdens of diseases 
causing OOPE on health care to increase.  
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.24 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.27 
 
Correlation coefficient r = ‐0.34 
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Table 4. Fixed-effect static and dynamic estimates 
on baseline variables 
Explanatory variables Statistic model No dummies 
Dynamic model 
No dummies 
oop  -0.19 (0.14) 
lnHIV -0.020 (0.00)* -0.012(0.01)* 
lnGDP 0.02 (0.00)* 0.030 (0.03)* 
hivp -0.09 (0.01) -0.045  (0.08) 
lnle 0.011 (0.08) 0.013(0.05) 
insur -0.04 (0.00) -0.05(0.00) 
Constant 4.55765 (0.36)  
Note: the dependent variable is oop. * Significant at 1%, 
standard errors in parenthesis. Logarithm not calculated for 
variables expressed as percentage, notably the proportion of 
expenditure covered by insurance (insur) and HIV prevalence 
rate (hivp) and the percentage of expenditure as OOPE (oop).  
One of the most important control variables in the 
analysis is income per capita, which has been 
theoretically indicated as the main determinant of 
expenditure. As Table 4 indicates, the income per 
capita (lnGDP) positively influences OOPE on health 
care (variable oop). This is as expected. The income 
elasticity of OOPE on health care ranges from 0.020 to 
0.030 depending on the model used. The income could 
have a negative effect on OOPE on health care where 
it is positively correlated with better health status. The 
fact that this is not the case is not surprising since 
average incomes in Africa are generally too small to 
influence positively health status to a sufficient extent. 
Another variable of policy interest is HIV/AIDS 
prevalence (hivp). The results show that the increase 
in HIV/AIDS prevalence decreases HIV/AIDS 
expenditure. The elasticity of OOPE on health care 
(variable oop) to the change in the HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate (variable hivp) ranges from 0.045 to 
0.09 in Africa depending on the model used. While 
HIV/AIDS prevalence was expected to correlate 
positively with OOPE on health care (variable oop), 
because it reflects the burden of HIV/AIDS disease, 
the result observed is against expectation. The 
observed negative relationship may be because 
HIV/AIDS prevalence includes a large number of 
people who seem to be relatively healthy.   
Life expectancy (lnle) is expected to be positively 
related to OOPE on health care (oop) and the result 
observed is as per expectation. Table 4 shows that 
the elasticity of OOPE on health care (variable oop) 
to a change in life expectancy (variable lne) ranges 
from 0.011 to 0.013. This implies that the longer 
people live, the more health care expenditure they 
incur. This result may reflect the fact that survival in 
Africa is correlated with poor quality of health and 
hence with more OOPE on health care.  
Prepayment for health care has been advanced as 
one of the ways to improve health care while 
improving welfare through a reduction in OOPE on 
health care when illness occurs. The results here 
show that the higher the prepayment, the lower the 
OOPE on health care (oop). The elasticity of OOPE 
on health care (oop) to prepayment ranges from 
0.004 to 0.005. Although low, these elasticities 
indicate that the move to prepayment systems can 
reduce OOPE on health care, a reduction that would 
increase the welfare of the population. 
The extent to which different groupings of African 
countries by income levels, prevalence levels or 
even by health system characteristics, differ in 
determining the OOPE on health care is analyzed 
using dummy variables for different groupings of 
countries. These results are shown in Table 5.   
Table 5 shows that being in a medium income group 
(US$400 < income per capita< 1000) and in a high-
income group (income per capita >= US$1000) 
according to the African income classification used 
in this study (variables gdpdum2, gdpdum3), 
decreases OOPE on health care relatively to a low-
income group (income per capita less than US$400). 
This result has policy implications in that the 
relatively poor pay more OOPE on health care 
probably because of their poorer health status. 
Furthermore, across prevalence groups, being in a 
higher prevalence group that is in blocks of 
countries in Africa where the prevalence rate is 
greater than 10%, decreases OOPE on health care 
(oop) compared to being in blocks of countries 
where the prevalence rate is lower. This result is 
consistent with the result presented above, as people 
who are HIV positive do not necessarily have to pay 
for health care.  
Table 5. Analysis of OOPE across countries 
Explanatory variables Static model with dummies 
Dynamic model 
with dummies 
oop  -0.23 (0.13) 
lnHIV -0.07 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
hivp -0.05 (0.03)*** -0.088 (0.13) 
lnle 0.016 (0.01) 0.004 (0.05) 
lnGDP 0.001 (0.002) 0.007 (0.04) 
insur -0.003 (0.00)** -0.003 (0.00)* 
gdpdum1 0 (base) 0 (base) 
gdpdum2 -0.07 (0.02)** -0.114 (0.03)* 
gdpdum3 -0.05 (0.00) -0.110 (0.05)* 
prevdum1 0 (base) 0 (base) 
prevdum2 -0.015 (0.04) 0.015 (0.07) 
prevdum3 -0.007 (0.07) 0.034 (0.11) 
prevdum4 -0.05 (0.01)* 0.097 (0.02) 
hsdum1 0 (base) 0 (base) 
hsdum2 0.045 (0.05) 0.010 (0.06) 
hsdum3 -0.01 (0.08)* -0.056 (0.01) 
constant 4.503 (0.377)  
Note: The dependent variable is OOP expenditure. * significant 
at 1%, ***significant at 5%, ***significant at 10%. 
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While there is a discernable pattern across blocks of 
countries with different income and prevalence, 
there is no such a pattern across blocks of countries 
with differing levels of prepayment.  In relation to 
the low prepayment block of countries represented 
by variable hsdum1, the next higher prepayment 
block, represented by the variable hsdum1, pays 
more OOPE on health care (oop). In contrast, the 
highest prepayment group (hsdum 3) pays less 
OOPE on health care compared to low-level 
prepayment blocks. This implies that prepayment 
might have a limited impact on health care 
depending on its level, although some other factors 
may be at the centre of this observation. The income 
factor could be the reason whereby the middle group 
would respond to illness with OOPE because they 
have relatively more income than the first group 
while the third block pays less because they are less 
ill because better health status and therefore less 
need to pay OOPE as a result of them being less 
frequently ill. 
Finally, it is important to understand that OOPE on 
health care in Africa is likely to be driven by the 
burden of disease (HIV-specific or other diseases), 
income and myriad other factors. With income 
being the most important of these factors, the paper 
used interaction of income per capita as a measure 
reflecting socioeconomic status and HIV/AIDS 
expenditure reflecting the burden of disease 
(intGDP) to gauge the relative influence of the 
burden due to HIV/AIDS versus the burden due to 
other diseases. The interaction was guided by the 
fact that these are the most important variables and 
that individually they have a different influence 
from previous analyses. The results including an 
interaction term are reported in Table 6.   
Table 6. The impact of foreign funding  
of HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa 
Explanatory 
variables 
Static model 
with interaction 
variables 
Dynamic model 
with interaction variables 
oop  -0.116 (0.14) 
lnHIV -0.053 (0.03)** -0.000 (0.03) 
hivp -0.001 (0.03) -0.008 (0.05) 
lnle 0.021 (0.08) 0.025 (0.09) 
lnGDP 0.185 (0.08)** 0.002 (0.00) 
insur -0.004 (0.00)** -0.001 (0.00) 
intGDP -0.011 (0.00)** -0.001 (0.00)*** 
constant 3.288866 (0.67)  
Note: the dependent variable is OOP, ** significant at 5% , ** 
significant at 10%, significant.  
The results show that an interaction term (intGDP) 
is significant and negative, while individually GDP 
increased the OOPE on health care (variable oop), 
and HIV/AIDS expenditure (lnHIV) decreased 
OOPE on health care (variable oop). As HIV/AIDS 
expenditure and national income grow together, the 
OOPE on health care decreases, indicating a 
dominant impact of HIV/AIDS expenditure on 
OOPE on health care.  
5. Discussion 
Assisting developing countries progress towards 
universal health care coverage has become a priority 
on the international policy agenda (UNAIDS, 2013), 
and success in this respect requires that policy 
makers act appropriately on factors related to 
universal coverage. This paper points to foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions as being 
one of the factors likely to influence progress 
towards universal coverage via its potential effect 
on OOPE on health care. Whether or not foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa 
increased or decreased OOPE on health care has 
however remained an empirical question.  
This paper was an attempt to provide such estimates 
and suggest policy implications. Using dynamic and 
statistic panel fixed-effect regression and the data 
collected in over 46 African countries, the paper 
produced evidence showing that an increase in 
foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions 
decreased OOPE on health care. These results make 
sense if one refers them to the framework 
underpinning this analysis. In fact, foreign 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions in Africa 
act as an additional income for households that can 
then increase their consumption, in line with 
economic theory. The increase in this consumption 
can, however be done in two ways, namely, by 
increasing expenditure on health care for other non-
HIV diseases or on other household items. In the 
context of this analytical framework, the evidence 
that an increase in foreign investments in HIV/AIDS 
interventions decreases OOPE on health care 
indicates that households increase their consumption 
of other household goods.  Other literature has 
linked this phenomenon to the fact that people 
substitute foreign funding for their current spending 
in a way that is consistent with the behavior of other 
economic agents reported in the literature. For 
instance, a study by Farag et al. (2009) found that 
donor funding for health substituted health financing 
by recipient governments in low- and middle-
income countries. In a closely related study in 
Canada, Stabile (2001, p. 991) found that 
government subsidies to holders of private 
insurance, resulted in these holders purchasing more 
insurance policies.   
An implication of these results is that HIV/AIDS 
remains the most significant burden of disease on 
the continent, to an extent that any income released 
as a result of foreign funding is used to fund other 
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non-health care household items. From a policy 
perspective, this result means that an increase in 
foreign funding would not only improve 
households’ circumstances as funds are released for 
more general household consumption, but it would 
also be consistent with the progress towards 
universal health coverage given the fact that OOPE 
on health care has been seen as a deterrent to this 
progress. The results suggest that decreasing foreign 
investments would lead to a policy dilemma, as this 
would influence OOPE on health care in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the need to progress 
towards universal health coverage.   
While the methodology used was meant to report a 
controlled influence of foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions on OOPE on health care, 
the study yielded other interesting results that are 
worth discussing. As predicted by economic theory, 
the study found that income (GDP) increased OOPE 
on health care. The elasticity of OOPE on health 
care to change in GDP per capita ranged from 0.001 
to 0.007. Higher income can, however, have a 
negative effect on OOPE on health care. Because 
most of the people are poor, this income effect was 
not observed. In relation to this finding, other 
studies found that socioeconomic status is negatively 
associated with OOPE on health care (Brinda, et al., 
2014, p. 6), yet others found evidence for an opposite 
effect (see for example, Schellenberg et al., 2003). 
Briefly, although the income effect on OOPE on health 
care might vary across contexts, this effect is on 
average positive in Africa.  
Unexpectedly, the results showed that an increase in 
HIV/AIDS prevalence by 1% results in a decrease in 
OOPE on health care by between 0.05% and 0.08%. 
An explanation of this result is that most of the people 
who live with HIV/AIDS may not be paying OOPE on 
health care as a result of being HIV positive. In fact, it 
is known that health care is needed only several years 
after HIV infection. Furthermore, the finding that the 
elasticity of OOPE on health care relative to change in 
life expectancy ranged between 0.004 and 0.016 as 
was expected. This result implied that as people live 
longer in Africa, they spend more on health care on 
average. This can be explained by the fact that this 
survival takes place in a context where there is poor 
quality of health. The level of prepayment influenced 
negatively OOPE on health care, as expected, with an 
increase in 1% in prepayment resulting in a decrease 
in OOPE on health care by 0.003. Other findings 
were that the higher the levels of HIV/AIDS 
prevalence in a country, the lower the OOPE on 
health care.   
The remaining question is how these results 
compare to the results of related studies that have 
been conducted previously. In fact, most of the 
previous analyses of the impact of OOPE on health 
care relative to income, HIV/AIDS prevalence and 
life expectancy, found similar results. Therefore, 
this study expanded on the available evidence. The 
study contributed to the literature though, by 
providing evidence crucial to policy making, on 
how foreign investments in HIV/AIDS interventions 
relate to OOPE on health care. This evidence has 
not been produced before.  
Before concluding, limitations of the study should 
be noted. It would have been better to report 
relationships of interest in the context of blocks of 
countries grouped according to the prevalence level 
of HIV/AIDS, health system characteristics, and 
prepayment levels. The methodology adopted could 
not be used for most blocks because of insufficiency 
of data. Furthermore, limited access to data related 
to government investments in HIV/AIDS 
interventions in countries studied confined the study 
to an analysis of the effects of foreign investments. 
While such analyses would have improved the 
results, the approach adopted in this study was the 
best possible approach to bring up this evidence that 
is important for policymaking. These shortcomings 
are referred to for future research.  
Conclusion 
The rationale behind this study was to provide 
policy makers with a basis on which to make sound 
policy decisions that are devoid of the dilemmas 
associated with various aspects of international 
development. In particular, the dilemma whether or 
not to propose a decrease in foreign investments in 
HIV/AIDS interventions is addressed. The evidence in 
this study shows that policies resulting in a decrease in 
investments in HIV/AIDS interventions would be 
detrimental to the principle of reaching universal 
coverage for health care in developing countries.  
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